Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a promising cryptographic technique for enabling secure collaborative machine learning in the cloud. However, support for homomorphic computation on ciphertexts under multiple keys is inefficient. Current solutions often require key setup before any computation or incur large ciphertext size (at best, grow linearly to the number of involved keys). In this paper, we proposed a new approach that leverages threshold and multi-key HE to support computations on ciphertexts under different keys. Our new approach removes the need of key setup between each client and the set of model owners. At the same time, this approach reduces the number of encrypted models to be offloaded to the cloud evaluator, and the ciphertext size with a dimension reduction from (N + 1) × 2 to 2 × 2. We present the details of each step and discuss the complexity and security of our approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure computation outsourcing allows the delegation of expensive computations to a resourceful cloud while preserving the privacy of user data [1] , [2] . Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a promising cryptographic technique that protects data in-transmission, at-rest, and in-use without decryption. These capabilities are important for enabling secure computation on private data in the cloud.
Typically in well-known HE schemes, such as BGV [3] , B/FV [4] , [5] , GSW [6] , homomorphic computation are performed on data that is encrypted under a single key pair. This leads to a weaker security model because all participants have to share the same key pair; that is, they can see each other's private data. Many cloud computing applications require stronger security, such that private data from different individuals is encrypted under different key pairs. This security model allows a group of users to contribute their encrypted data to a cloud evaluator for joint computations without giving away their privacy. We refer to such setting as secure collaborative computing.
Collaborative machine learning [7] is an increasingly important application of secure collaborative computing because of the growing interesting in Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) in the cloud. A set of parties cooperate in training predictive models on their private datasets and perform secure classification for the given client inputs, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . For instance, in the application of medical diagnosis multiple hospitals and medical laboratories contribute their health data to train predictive models. In another example, credit agencies such as Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion, can jointly assess a customer's credit score but none of them are willing to give up their models. Joint datasets and models are more diverse and often contain features that help to achieve better accuracy. Operating on encrypted data helps to prevent incidents such as the Equifax data leak [8] . 
A. Computing with multiple keys
Computing on ciphertexts that are encrypted under different key pairs can be tricky and inefficient. Threshold HE [9] can produce a joint key using system participants' keys based on the additive homomorphic property of secret keys. Before any computation, all participants cooperate to produce a joint key in a setup phase. Data will be encrypted using this joint key. At the end of the evaluation, the users must cooperate to decrypt the result using a multi-party computation (MPC) protocol. The security of this approach is based on the learning-witherror assumption [10] that hides the keys and a dishonestmajority secret-sharing model [11] . In other words, no one individual can retrieve the result unless all are cooperating.
The dishonest-majority model may not be efficient in the collaborative setting. Suppose we have N model owners and P clients, as illustrated in Fig. 1 , for every client we need to generate a joint key for this client and the group of N model owners; that is, we will need to produce and maintain P joint keys. This also means that each model owner has to provide P copies of the encrypted model to the cloud.
As another solution, multi-key HE [12] supports homomorphic computation on ciphertexts encrypted under different keys without a joint key setup. Ciphertexts can be extended "on-thefly" to a concatenation of participants' keys. The size, more specifically dimension, of an extended ciphertext increases with respect to the number of involved keys. The most efficient construction of MKHE [13] is based on the BGV scheme [3] , where the ciphertext size increases linearly. For our collaborative machine learning scenario, an MKHE solution will require each ciphertext to be extended to N + 1 different keys (i.e., the model owners keys plus the key of the requesting client) before any computation. The efficiency of the system is affected especially if the number of model owners is large because it proportionally increases the ciphertext size.
B. Our approach
In this paper, we propose a new approach that supports homomorphic computation over ciphertexts encrypted under multi-key and produces small ciphertexts. More specifically, because the group of N model owners are likely to remain the same during the evaluation, we propose to generate a joint key using the threshold HE approach. Client's request can be dynamic; hence we adopt the idea of "on-the-fly" ciphertext extension to transform a ciphertext under the joint key to one under a concatenation of the model owner's joint key and the client's key. The same treatment is applied to the ciphertexts under the client's key. By purposefully combining the two approaches, we remove the requirement of generating a joint key for every client and the group of model owners. Also, we reduce the number of encrypted models from P to 1 and the dimension of the extended ciphertexts from (N + 1) × 2 to 2 × 2. Note, these approaches are based on the BGV HE scheme; hence, the base ciphertext dimension is 1 × 2. Table I provides a summary of our comparison. In this analysis, we focus on the ciphertexts of the models because they are stored in the cloud and used in every evaluation. Also, we make another contribution in proposing a new decryption protocol based on the MPC protocol.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of the cryptographic techniques used in this paper is presented in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we present the details and analysis of our approach. We discuss the related work in Sec. V and conclude the paper in Sec. VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notations and definitions
Given a vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), we define a[i] = a i as the i-th element. Let m × n be the matrix dimensions and B[i, j] be the j-th element of the i-th row. The dot product of the two vectors a, b is denoted as a, b = n i=1 a[i] · b[i], and the tensor product is denoted as a ⊗ b.
For a security parameter λ, let Φ(x) = x η + 1 be a cyclotomic polynomial where η as a power of 2. Define the ring R over the integers R = Z, or over polynomials with integer coefficients R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)), which can be bounded by q ∈ Z. Let χ be a Gaussian error distribution over R q = Z q and bounded by B q. The security of the HE schemes is based on the LWE assumption or its ring variant.
Definition II.1 (LWE [10] ). Let a and s be uniformly sampled elements from R q = Z q , and let e ← χ be a sampled error term. The learning with errors (LWE) problem [10] is to distinguish the pair of (a i , b i = as + e) from any uniformly sampled pair (a i , b i ) ← R 2 q . The LWE assumption is that LWE problem is computationally infeasible. In another word, secret key s is hidden by the element a ∈ R q with small noise.
Definition II.2 (Ring-LWE [14] ). Let q and t be two co-prime moduli where q t, we define the ciphertext space
The RLWE assumption is simply the general LWE assumption but instantiated over the ring of polynomials R q .
B. Key switching
This technique is applied after homomorphic operations to transform a ciphertext from one under the key s to one under a different key s . It is also called the relinearization step [3] that reduces the dimension after each homomorphic multiplication and yield a normal ciphertext that is decryptable by the secret key s . This transformation is accomplished with the aid of auxiliary information provided as evaluation key ek which encrypts s under s . To perform key switching, two essential functions are needed: -EvalKeyGen(s, s ): Given two keys s ∈ R k q , s ∈ R 2 q , let β = log q and compute the powers-of-2 of the old secret keys = Powersof2(s) = (2 0 s, 2s, . . . , 2 β s) ∈ R kβ q . Sample kβ RLWE instances (a i , a i s + te i ) and output
..,kβ -KeySwitch(ek, c) Given a ciphertext c ∈ R k q under s and the evaluation key ek, decompose the ciphertext to its binary such thatc = BitDecom(c) = (u 0 , . . . , u log q ) where c = log q i=0 (u i 2 i ) and output the new ciphertext
q which is encrypted under the new key s .
C. Threshold HE
Asharov et al. [9] proposed a threshold scheme extended from the BGV scheme [3] . Formally, given a set of n public keys pk i = (A, As i + te i ) where i ∈ {1, n}, the element A ∈ R q is shared, s i is the underlaying private key. We generate a joint public key pk * = (A, A s i + t e i ). Note that only the second component of the individual public keys is aggregated such that underlying partial secret keys s i are homomorphically added together under the RLWE assumption. If we add both components of the public keys, the joint key will be pk * = (nA, As * + te * ). Subsequently, a ciphertext encrypted under the joint key will be c = (c 0 , c 1 ) = (γnA, γAs * +te * +µ). Decryption will fail because (γnAs * = γAs * ). Two-round setup protocol is required to generate the joint evaluation key ek * , which is required for performing key switching after each homomorphic multiplication since its generation is trickier due to its fundamentally complex structure. To decrypt, each user contributes their partial key s i by computing c 0 s i + te i . Then, all users collaboratively produce a component that contains the sum of all secret keys shares, that is (c 0 s * + te * ) = (c 0 s i + t e i ). Refer to the decryption process Dec(c, sk) = c 1 − c 0 s * , the message can be decrypted correctly when we compute c 1 − (c 0 s * + te * ).
D. The ring-GSW scheme
Chen et al. [13] proposed a ring variant of the GSW scheme [6] based on the RLWE problem. The ring-GSW (RGSW) operates in a ring of polynomials, and its plaintext is a ring element instead of a single bit. This scheme is used to generate the evaluation keys that are needed after each homomorphic operation in the multi-key BGV scheme as will be discussed in the next subsection. Here, we describe below the main functions of the RGSW scheme. q . Note that we need β RLWE instances (a, b) to encrypt βbits of the secret key needed for evaluation key generation -RGSW.Enc(pk, µ): Let µ ← R q be a message and pk = (a, b) be a given public key. Let G be a gadget matrix which is a diagonal matrix containing powers-of-2 g = (1, 2, 4, . . . ,
To encrypt the message µ, choose a random element γ ← χ and two error terms (e 0 , e 1 ) ← χ 2β×2 and compute the ciphertext as:
Note that the propriety sc = t(e 0 , e 1 ) + µsG holds.
-RGSW.EncRand(pk, γ): Let γ be the randomness used to encrypt a message µ, and pk = (a, b) be a given public key. To encrypt the randomness, compute the powere-of-2 such that Powersof2(γ) = (γ, 2γ, . . . , 2 β−1 γ). Choose β new random elements γ ← χ and two new error terms (e 0 , e 1 ) ← χ β . Compute the ciphertext as
This encryption of randomness will be used to generate auxiliary information to help decrypting the extended ciphertexts.
-RGSW.Ext(C i , F i , {pk j ; j = 1, . . . , N }): Given a set of N public keys (pk 1 , . . . , pk N ) and a ciphertext C i encrypting a message µ under pk i , extend the ciphertext to multi-keys as followsC
q is constructed using the public key pk j and the encrypted randomness F j such that the k-th row is:
The scheme supports multi-hop extension, which means that an extended ciphertext can be further extended to additional keys. With each extension, the gadget matrix G is also extended to create a 2N β × 2K matrix where the diagonal element is G. Note that the size of the extended ciphertext C grows quadratically with the number of involved keys.
E. The multi-key BGV Scheme
Chen et al. [13] introduced the first multi-key BGV (MK-BGV) scheme that is based on the RLWE assumption. The new scheme extends the BGV scheme [3] to a multi-hop MKHE setting (i.e., the extended ciphertext can be extended to further keys after the homomorphic evaluation). The scheme supports extending a ciphertext to a fixed number of keys. Similar to other RLWE-based schemes, the new multi-key BGV (MKBGV) scheme requires a generation of evaluation keys to perform key switching technique after each homomorphic operation. In the proposed scheme, the evaluation keys are generated as ring-GSW ciphertexts such that they can be extended to multiple keys which correspond to the extended ciphertext. We describe below the main functions of the proposed MKBGV scheme.
-MKBGV.Setup(λ, L): Given the security parameter λ, a multiplicative depth L, a bound K on the number of keys, define the ring of polynomials R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)) and the error distribution χ as described earlier. Choose the plaintext module t that is co-prime with L + 1 chosen decreasing ciphertext moduli q L · · · q 0 for each level and set β l = log q l + 1. For each level l ∈ {L, . . . , 0}, uniformly sample an element A l ← R 2β l q l . Finally, output pp = (R, χ, {q l , A l } l∈{L,...,0} , t) as the public parameters for the scheme. 
Output the user's public key as the set of tuples pk = {(b l , A l )} l∈{L,...,0} . -For each level l ∈ {L, . . . , 0}, generate the helper component ek l which is used later to generate the evaluation key for the performing homomorphic evaluation on extended ciphertexts. The component consists of two pairs of ringvariant of GSW ciphertexts which encrypt each bit of the user's secret key s and encrypt the randomness used in the encryption. For each bit i = 0, . . . , 2β l , sample two random elements r i,l , r i,l ← χ and the error matrix E i,l = (e i,l,1 , e i,l,2 ) ∈ χ 2β l ×2 . Compute the ring-GSW ciphertexts under the (l − 1)-th public key element:
and the corresponding BGV encryptions of randomness F i,l (and F i,l ), which encrypts each bit of the random element r i,l (and r i,l ). Finally, output the helper component for the evaluation key generated as
..,2β l },l∈{L,...,0} -MKBGV.Enc(pk, µ): Given a message µ ← R t and a user's public key pk, perform the original BGV encryption function starting at level L. Later, as the ciphertext is evaluated, the level changes to a small l ∈ {L − 1, . . . , 0} Sample error noises e, e ← χ and a random polynomial with binary coefficients r ← R 2 and compute the ciphertext as c = (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ R 2 q L where c 0 = rb L + te + µ and c 1 = rA L + te . Moreover, suppose that S is an ordered set of all indexes of the users in which a ciphertext is encrypted under their secret keys. Output the fresh BGV ciphertext as the tuple c = (c, S, L). We denote [·] as a regular BGV ciphertext encrypted under the public key pk. Note that the output is fresh encryption; hence, it is starting at level L. However, this level changes as the ciphertext is evaluated. q l encrypted under the same concatenated keyss l , perform homomorphic addition as element-wise addition c add =c +c ( mod q l ) or the homomorphic multiplication as the tensor productc mult =c⊗c ( mod q l ). After the homomorphic evaluation, perform KeySwitch technique using the generated evaluation keyēk l to generate a ciphertext under the next level's keys l−1 , and the ModulusSwitch technique to reduce the resultant noise by switching to a smaller ciphertext modulus q l−1 .
-MKBGV.Dec({sk 1 , . . . , sk N },c): Given an extended ciphertextc encrypted at level l under the set S of users' keys, and the secret keys l = {s 1,l | . . . |s N,l } that is the concatenation of all the users' secret keys in the set, decryption is as
The decryption is correct since each secret key s i,l decrypts the corresponding sub-vector ciphertext c i .
III. PROPOSED APPROACH A. System setting
We describe our approach with a working example of collaborative evaluation of random forest for classification tasks. In the collaborative setting, as shown in Fig. 1 , a semi-honest cloud "evaluator" classifies a client based on the encrypted decision trees from the N model owners. More formally, each model owner M i ; i ∈ {1, . . . , N } encrypts their decision tree T i that consists of a set of decision nodes and leaf nodes under their respective keys. At each decision node, a boolean function is securely evaluated using an encrypted threshold y and a client's encrypted input x. The output is an encrypted bit b, which is used to perform a conditional branching to traverse to the leaf node that contains a class label. At the end of the decision tree evaluation, the evaluator performs a secure counting protocol to calculate the frequency of each unique class label. Note, we focus on random forest evaluation for clarity, but the proposed approach is applicable to other ML techniques, such as deep learning because it requires matrix operations on data encrypted under different keys.
Boolean function within each decision node is the fundamental unit within a decision tree. For clarity, we focus our description on evaluating a Boolean function and a conditional branching program in one of the decision nodes. Similar evaluation procedures follow for the rest of the decision nodes. Suppose this decision node has two leaf nodes with two distinct class labels A, B ∈ {0, 1}. Let a client C holds an input bit x ∈ {0, 1} encrypted under his key pk C . Suppose each model owner M i holds an one node decision tree represented as the polynomial T i = b i · A + (1 − b i ) · B and a threshold y i ∈ {0, 1} encrypted under a joint key pk M . Assume this decision node contains a Boolean function b i = 1(x = y i ) = x + y i (mod 2), the output bit b i is then used to evaluate the branching program for T i and output a class label A or B. Note, the output of T i is A if x and y i differ, otherwise it outputs B. Let the random forest F = {T 1 , . . . , T N } be the collection of random forest outputs. The final output of F depends on the frequency of each unique class label.
B. Current solutions
In the collaborative setting in Fig. 1 , one can use a threshold HE scheme to support computation with different keys. Mainly, participants (i.e., model owners M i and client C i ) generate among them a joint key from their individual keys to encrypt their inputs and compute under this joint key. Let P be the number of clients registered in the system. Before the computation, the set of N model owners must have a key setup with each of their clients C i to generate a joint key pk M,Ci . This means the model owners generate in advance P different joint keys {pk M,C∞ , . . . , pk M,C P }. This approach also means that each model owner must prepare P encrypted copies of their models to the cloud, one for each distinct joint key.
As an alternative, participants can encrypt their inputs under their individual keys, but extend them to additional keys using the MKHE scheme at evaluation. This way, the model owners delegate one encryption copy of their models to the cloud. When a client C i requests an evaluation, each SWHE ciphertext c = (c 0 , c 1 ) is extended to one in the form c = {c M1 | . . . |c M N |c Ci } ∈ R 2(N +1)q under the set of N + 1 keys {pk M1 , . . . , pk M N , pk Ci }, resulting in linear expansion of the ciphertext size.
Our proposed approach leverages both the threshold and multi-key HE techniques. There is no need to set up a joint key for each client with the model owners, and ciphertexts are extended only under two different keys instead of N + 1 keys resulting in a reduction in the ciphertext size.
C. Our new approach
Our new approach consists of four different phases: key setup, encryption, evaluation, and decryption. Figures 2 and 3 give an illustration and overview of these four phases.
1) Key setup: In this phase, we generate key pair (pk Mi , sk Mi ) for each model owner, and key pair (pk Ci , sk Ci ) for each client. Moreover, we generate the corresponding evaluation helper elements ek Mi and ek Ci , which encrypts auxiliary information about the secret key. These elements are used to produce the evaluation key ek, which is required to perform key switching after each homomorphic evaluation in the multi-key BGV scheme. a) Model owners: In this system setting, the N model owners do not change frequently; hence, we set up a joint key pk M once before the start of the protocol as shown in Fig. 2(a) . The joint key is generated, in a threshold manner, as the sum of the model owners' individual keys pk M = N i=1 = pk Mi . It is used to encrypt the models before sending them to the cloud. Note that the encrypted model cannot be decrypted unless all the model owners collaborated since the corresponding secret key sk M is shared among them. The joint key can be revoked or updated, but this requires running the threshold key setup again and encrypting the models with the new joint key. This threshold key setup differs from the one proposed by Asharov et al. [9] because, at the end of their protocol, the evaluation key ek that is used in evaluation is directly generated. However, in our approach, we need first to generate the evaluation helper element ek that can be extended later in the MKHE scheme described in Sec II-E.
As mentioned, ek must encrypt information on the bits of the secret key s M . The secret key s M is shared among N parties; therefore, we can generate the evaluation helper element by homomorphically adding the individual ek Mi . The homomorphic addition can be achieved by using performing a fast full adder on the encrypted bits. The full adder algorithm contains a homomorphic multiplication, which is not the most efficient design. We briefly discuss optimization in Sec. IV. b) Clients: Each client C independently generates their own key pair (sk C , pk C ). The output of the key generation step also includes a generated evaluation helper element ek C . 
q . After that, the obtained boolean value is used to evaluate the model
The homomorphic multiplication of two extended ciphertextsc,c ∈ R 4 q is performed as a tensor productc ⊗c ∈ R 16 q , which increases the dimension exponentially. The key switching technique is then applied with the help of the evaluation key ek to reduce the dimension, such thatc mult = KeySwitch(ek,c⊗c ) ∈ R 4 q , and perform further homomorphic operations.
After evaluating each model {T 1 (x), . . . , T N (x), the results are aggregated using a secure count protocol (its implementation is omitted due to space limitations). The output of the protocol is the encryption of the class label with the highest count. 4) Decryption: After the evaluation, the evaluator produces the result that is encrypted under the extended key (pk C , sk C )
{ek' C } ... 
In the collaborative system design, the client will not be able to decrypt the result without model owners' secret shares of the key. Hence, the evaluator invokes a decryption protocol to obtain a decryption component needed to perform the part N i=1 c M , s Mi from the decryption algorithm shown above. In our protocol, the evaluator performs a partial decryption on the result such that it transforms it to a ciphertext under the client's key. As shown in Fig. 2(c) , the evaluator sends c M,1 to all model owners. Upon receiving c M,1 , each model owner M i will construct ρ i = c M,1 s Mi + te Mi , where e Mi is a large smudging noise, and return it back to the evaluator. After collecting the components from all model owners, the evaluator send the extended encrypted resultc to the client along with the aggregated value ρ = N i=1 ρ i = c M,1 s M + te M . The client then computes:
IV. SECURITY AND COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
A. Security analysis
Our proposed approach is secure in the semi-honest setting, where the system users follow the protocol specification and do not deviate from it. The semi-honest cloud evaluates on encrypted models and client inputs, which are protected under the semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme.
The decryption protocol follows the dishonest-majority assumption where all the users are required to participate in decryption to retrieve the final classification result. Note that the cloud invokes a threshold decryption protocol to generate a decryption component from the model owners. This step generates the decryption component for the partial ciphertext c M encrypted under pk M , but the result remains encrypted under the client's key, who performs the final decryption.
B. Complexity analysis
We analyze the space and communication complexities of the proposed approach. The size of the extended ciphertext expands at most two concatenated ciphertext, i.e., a constant of size 2. For communication, the one-time threshold key setup requires at most N interactions between model owners. The collaborative evaluation of the models based on the client's input requires two interactions. The decryption protocol requires 2N interactions with the model owners.
C. Optimizations
The threshold key setup in our approach is performed in an MPC setting. While the design is secure, it is not efficient due to the full adder circuit that consists of homomorphic multiplication. Alternatively as an optimization, we can make a small security trade-off by using a trusted party. The trusted party generates a key pair (pk M , sk M ), and the evaluation helper element ek directly from the secret key sk M = s M . To produce the secret shares of the secret key for each model owner {M 1 , . . . , M N }, we sample N small secrets such that
V. RELATED WORK A common way to support multiple keys is to leverage the additive homomorphism of the key space. This property enables the establishment of a joint key from individual keys owned by individual users without the need for a trusted party. By direct aggregation of the users' public keys, we can effortlessly set up a (n, n) threshold encryption scheme. Desmedt and Frankel [15] proposed a threshold version of ElGamal scheme [16] based on Shamir's secret sharing. Specifically, assume we have set of n users where each with user i has an Setup phase.
Model owner Mi ∈ M: (1) Generate SWHE key pairs (pk M i , skM i ) and evaluation helper element ek M i (2) Generate with the other model owners the joint key pk M = N i=1 pk M i and the evaluation helper element ek M = N i=1 ek M i . (3) Provide a threshold bit y ∈ R2 and two possible output bits A, B ∈ R2. (4) Define a model as the polynomial Ti = bi · A + (1 − bi) · B, such that bi = 1(x = yi). Client C: (1) Provide an input bit x ∈ R2.
(2) Generate SWHE key pairs (pk C , skC)) and the evaluation helper element ek C Encryption phase. (3) Send (pk C , ek C , [x]) to the evaluator to start the evaluation. Fig. 3 : An overview of secure decision tree evaluation phases using the proposed approach for multi-key support.
independently generated key pair (pk i = g si , sk i = s i ). Then, the joint key is computed as pk * = n i=1 pk i = pk n i=1 si . A user can encrypt the data under the generated joint public key and compute using the homomorphic properties of the scheme. However, the decryption of the ciphertexts has to be performed by all n users. Asharov et al. [9] proposed another threshold scheme extended from the BGV scheme [3] . Detail of this scheme was described in Section II.
A more dynamic approach to support multiparty computation with multiple keys is multi-key HE. Lopez-Alt et al [12] introduced the first notion of MKHE schemes to support the homomorphic evaluation on ciphertexts encrypted under different keys. Its construction was based on NTRU. Many works [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] followed after proposing constructions with different capabilities and security assumptions. Similar to threshold HE schemes, distributed decryption is required where the users collaborate to decrypt.
The first multi-key HE scheme that is based on the LWE problem was proposed by Clear and McGoldrick [17] . It was then simplified by Mukherjee and Wichs [18] who also built a general two-round MPC protocol on top of it. The basic scheme is constructed based on the GSW scheme [6] and extended to support multiple keys. For an unbounded number of users, they can homomorphically compute on their individually encrypted inputs and output a ciphertext result encrypted under multiple keys. The scheme is described as single-hop, which means that the ciphertext result cannot be extended to additional keys after being homomorphically evaluated. The decryption of the result can be retrieved by combining partial decryptions which were performed by each party.
A more advanced MKHE enables multi-hop key extension, which intuitively means that a homomorphically evaluated ciphertext can be further extended to additional keys. Peikert and Shiehian [20] proposed two (leveled) MKHE schemes basing their security on the standard LWE and its circular security assumptions. The core difference between the two schemes is the extension function which results in largely expanded ciphertexts in the first scheme, and small original GSW ciphertexts with large expanded public keys in the second scheme. A ciphertext can be expanded to one that is encrypted under a set of users' concatenated keys. The size of the ciphertext increases quadratically with the number of users. They also proposed an alternative scheme, in which it yields small keys and large ciphertexts. More technically, the key pair is just GSW key, and helper information matrices are embedded in the ciphertexts instead of public keys. However, this design is less practical than their main proposed scheme since it is more likely that the number of homomorphic operations on the ciphertext exceeds the number of extended keys.
Brakerski and Perlman [19] proposed a fully MKHE scheme based on the GSW scheme which realized extended ciphertexts that grows linearly with the size of included keys. The scheme applies on-the-fly bootstrapping technique to enable unlimited multiple evaluations on extended ciphertexts. Chen et al. [13] proposed the first MKHE scheme that is based on RLWE. They extend the BGV scheme [3] to a multi-hop MKHE where the ciphertext size also grows linearly with the number of the bounded number of keys. The evaluation keys are generated as ring-GSW ciphertexts such that they can be extended to multiple keys which correspond to the expanded ciphertext.
Advancements have been proposed in the literature to extend homomorphic ciphertexts to multiple users' keys. The ciphertexts can be decrypted using the concatenated secret keys associated with public keys. Releasing secret keys to other parties presents security issues since a released secret key can be used to decrypt the user's other ciphertexts. The more secure approach used in proposed MKHE schemes is to hold a secure MPC decryption protocol where each of the involved users locally performs partial decryption of the ciphertext using his secret key. Yasuda et al., [22] proposed an alternative approach which applies Proxy Re-Encryption technique (PRE) to allow an extended ciphertext to be reencrypted under the receiver's key such that it becomes decryptable by its secret key. Their work extends the Peikert-Shiehian MKHE scheme [20] to include two more functions, one for generating a re-encryption key, and the other is for performing the ciphertext re-encryption.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new approach that combines the threshold and multi-key HE to support collaborative computation on ciphertexts encrypted under different keys. In the collaborative machine learning setting, our proposed approach (i) removes the need of key setup between a client and the set of model owners, (ii) reduces the number of encryption of the same model, and (iii) reduces the ciphertext size with dimension reduction from (N + 1) × 2 to 2 × 2. We presented the detail design of this approach and analyzed the complexity and security.
